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Transmission mechanisms of monetary policy 
in an economy with partial dollarisation: 
the case of Peru
1 
Zen￿n Quispe Misaico, Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
1. Introduction 
Implementing monetary policy requires a good understanding and modelling of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. In the particular case of developing economies like Peru, this transmission 
mechanism would need to consider the degree of financial market development, price rigidities, the 
partial dollarisation of the economy, some possible non-linearity and the operating procedures of the 
central bank. It is also vital to be able to identify if shocks are transitory or permanent, nominal or real. 
These characteristics, together with the central bank￿s aversion/tendency to frequent policy changes 
and the structure of its loss function, will exert some influence on the monetary policymaker￿s reaction 
function. 
In Peru, studies on monetary policy have shown that monetary transmission channels are not very 
clear. Moreover, the macroeconomic predictors and lag structures are less stable than in the case of 
developed economies, while economic variable series present some structural differences and are 
quite short-sampled and unstable. 
Another important issue for monetary policy is the ability to forecast inflation in order to activate the 
operational procedures required to reach its main monetary stability target. However, both forecasts of 
inflation and the magnitude and time horizon of the central bank￿s reaction function depend on 
adequate identification of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. In general, understanding 
monetary transmission mechanisms is essential to adequate design and implementation of monetary 
policy. This aspect is even more important when the monetary authority announces the medium-term 
path of the inflation target, as in the case of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
Four important elements should be noted with regard to these transmission mechanisms: 
 the relative importance of supply and demand shocks in explaining inflation; 
 the best indicator of monetary policy stance; 
 the time horizon of monetary policy￿s impact on inflation; and 
 the magnitude of monetary policy￿s impact on inflation. 
We are interested in identifying the transmission mechanisms of the monetary policy action in reaching 
its main goal: the reduction of the inflation rate. First, we intend to identify the sources of variation of 
the inflation rate, modelling, in a structural VAR, supply, demand and monetary shocks. The empirical 
evaluation of this model will give us some insights as to the policy instrument that best fits the 
monetary policy goals, whether influencing the aggregate demand or the supply side through the cost 
structure of firms. The empirical results show that the inflation process in Peru is mostly driven by 
demand shocks, with monetary shocks accounting for 30-40% of inflation rate variance. 
The second step, identifying the best indicator of the monetary policy stance, found that different 
studies for Peru on this topic have shown that money aggregates are the best indicators of the 
monetary policy stance. 
A third step in identifying the monetary transmission mechanisms is to model the operating procedures 
of the central bank, principally its interactions with the banking system through the money market, 
considering the partial dollarisation of the economy. The empirical results of these structural VAR 
                                                       
1  This paper represents the views and analysis of the author and not those of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru.  
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procedures give some indication of the time horizon and the magnitude of the impact of monetary 
policy on its final target: the inflation rate. In this case, the estimations conclude that the time horizon 
of monetary policy transmission is between eight and 16 months. This result is consistent with a small 
open economy with partial dollarisation such as Peru. Another finding is that every 10 additional 
percentage points of variation in base money generate an additional 3.8% of inflation. A 10% 
depreciation of the exchange rate generates 1.2% of additional inflation. 
A fourth interesting topic on monetary transmission mechanisms is the identification of the different 
transmission channels. We concentrate our attention on the money and credit channels considering 
the coexistence of currency denominations of banking sector credit to the private sector. The empirical 
results show that the money channel seems to be effective in Peru. There is no clear evidence of the 
effectiveness of the credit channel. 
2.  What drives the inflation rate: supply or demand shocks? 
A first step in designing monetary policy is to diagnose the sources of inflation. In this section, we 
address the question of whether supply or demand shocks explain most of the inflation in Peru and the 
explanatory importance of money in demand shocks. We use the procedures developed by Machado 
et al back in 1994
 to explain the postwar US inflation process, based on the VAR models used by 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1994) and the decomposition of shocks used in Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
The appendix describes the model identification and procedures of Machado et al (op cit). 
With a classical GDP-prices-money structural VAR,
2 and considering that positive supply shocks 
increase output and reduce the price level while positive demand shocks increase both output and 
prices, we carried out some estimations using alternately base money and household cash holdings 
as monetary indicators. With monthly data from 1979-2000 we found that monetary shocks explain a 
significant part (between 22 and 30%) of the variance of inflation (see Graph 1). Demand shocks 
account for more than 60% over short (four-month) and long (16-month) horizons. Supply shocks 
seem to be of no relevance here. If we consider household cash holdings as the indicator of monetary 
policy, money shocks account for a more important portion of inflation (between 30 and 35%). This is 
consistent with the transactional role of household cash holdings which, consistent with many 
theoretical views, are the best indicator of aggregate demand in the economy (Graph 2). In sum, 
demand shocks explain more than 50% of the variance of inflation for short and long horizons, and 
money shocks explain inflation in a range of 30-40%. The evaluation of a smaller and more recent 
sample (considering important changes in monetary policy due to the stabilisation process and the 
structural reforms implemented since August 1990), from 1992-2000, produced no significant change 
in the results. 
There was no clear conclusion about the relative importance of each shock in explaining GDP growth. 
We may argue that there are no important demand impacts on GDP growth, such that monetary policy 
is more effective when dealing with inflation. 
                                                       
2  For the optimum lag structure of the variables and the Unit Root tests, we used the same procedures as Quispe (2000). The 
Akaike and Schwarz criteria result in a three-month optimal lag, and the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests 
show stationarity of the economic variables in first differences.  







The impulse responses show a clear impact of demand shocks on inflation even with the identification 
uncertainty stated by the Machado et al model (Graph 3). The supply shocks explain inflation with the 
right negative sign but with less power than demand shocks.  





There is no clear conclusion about the relative importance of each shock in explaining GDP growth 
(Graph 4). This confirms our earlier finding that monetary policy is more effective in dealing with 
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The exactly identified model with the imposition of the long-run restriction gives no changes in the 
main results (Graph 5). Supply, demand and money shocks (base money or cash holdings) explain 
inflation with the expected sign as it is in the IS-LM framework. 
3.  Indicators of monetary policy stance 
The previous section shows evidence that the inflation process in Peru has been driven by demand 
shocks, with monetary shocks accounting for a range of 30-40% inflation rate variance. Moreover, in 
identifying the best indicator of monetary policy stance, different studies have shown that money 
aggregates are the best such indicators in Peru. 
Berg and Borenzstein (2000), using a sample of 82 quarters (from 1975 Q3 to 1995 Q4), found that 
narrow aggregates (base money and currency in circulation) best explain the inflation rate in Peru. 
However, given the structural breaks in price equations with all monetary aggregates in 1990, when 
Peru stabilised inflation and changed its exchange rate regime, they also made estimations with a 
smaller sample of 20 quarters (from 1991 Q1 to 1995 Q4) and found some evidence that broad money 
(including domestic and foreign currency deposits) could be the best predictor of inflation. In this last 
result, there is the possibility of a small sample bias due to low degrees of freedom. 
Using a larger and monthly data sample (from 1991 M1 to 2000 M6), and considering end of period 
and monthly average data, Quispe (2000) found that narrow monetary aggregates are still the best 
predictors of inflation in Peru. These results are consistent with the asset substitution characteristic of 
the dollarisation process in Peru. 
As seen in the previous section, money still has a significant impact on inflation. In addition, since 
1995, different studies on monetary policy in Peru have shown that monetary aggregates seem to be 
the best indicators of monetary policy stance. The following table gives an overview of these studies. 
Studies on monetary policy in Peru 




Luque and Perea (1995)  Base money     
Ishisaka and Quispe (1995)  Reserves, current account balances in 
CB, CB CD interest rate  6-14 months  1.5% 
Bringas and Tuesta (1997)  Excess reserves  3-12 months   
Le￿n (1999)  Cash holdings of households  4-14 months   
Barrera (2000)  CB CDs interest rate  8-12 months  2.0% 
Grippa and Ferreyros (2000)  Cash holdings of households  9-12 months   
Quispe (2000)  Base money and cash holdings  8-16 months   
One explanation for the results of these studies is that the demand side of base money is mainly 
composed of household cash holdings (80%), which have a close relationship with current 
transactions in the economy. For current transactions, Peruvian households mainly use domestic 
currency. 
Another aspect of these findings is connected to the time horizon of the transmission mechanism. This 
horizon has been expanding so that there is a more lagged impact of monetary policy on inflation, as 
the economy evolves over time and works in a more stable macroeconomic scenario. Is this a sign of 
higher credibility of monetary policy and of the commitment of the central bank to its inflation target? 
This evidence may suggest so. 
As evidence of the transactional role of household cash holdings, the daily figures of this monetary 
variable follow a predictable pattern, reflecting the fact that the households are telling us: ￿I hold the 
money that I currently need for transactions￿ (Graph 6). 
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4.  Monetary transmissions and the operating procedures of the central 
bank 
With regard to the main channels in the monetary transmission mechanism in Peru, we summarise 
below important facts described by De la Rocha (1998). 
The money channel seems to be effective in Peru because dollarisation is not of the currency 
substitution type. Central Reserve Bank of Peru estimates have shown that an increase in central 
bank CD interest rates tends to feed through to the banking overnight interest rate. This can then 
change longer-term market interest rates and so affect aggregate demand and inflation. 
It is less clear whether the credit channel is important in a dollarised economy such as Peru. On the 
one hand, corporations tend to rely on the banking sector for credit, and bank credit is replacing 
informal funds for investment finance. (It is also worth noting that many non-bank financial institutions 
have liabilities outside the domestic financial sector.) On the other hand, the access of domestic firms 
to foreign credit and equity financing (on domestic and foreign markets) is becoming more important. 
The exchange rate would seem a priori to be an important channel of monetary transmission in Peru. 
If domestic and foreign assets are highly substitutable, interest rate changes can lead to large foreign 
exchange swings and then feed into domestic prices. The ability of the central bank to intervene 
systematically to control inflation through the exchange rate is weak due to the asset substitution. 
These facts constrain the intervention of the central bank in the exchange market to only supporting its 
monetary targets and smoothing out large fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
In Section 5, we try to identify the credit channel of monetary transmission considering that in the 
Peruvian case there is a banking credit dependence of small and medium-sized firms, and a very 
limited participation of large corporations in the incipient Peruvian capital markets. In theory, in this 
context the credit (lending) channel of monetary policy would be fully active. However, the central 
bank￿s ability to reduce the credit supply of the commercial banks through the reduction of domestic 
currency financial funds of the banking system is limited due to the existence of alternative external 
sources of funding, neutralising the possible impacts of monetary policy on domestic credit to the 
private sector. 
Just by looking at the credit series it is not possible to identify which part of the credit variations 
represents changes in the supply of funds (associated with the credit or lending channel) and which 
part is accounted for by changes in the demand for credit (mainly associated with the money channel). 
However, through a structural VAR procedure it is possible to model the fact that with demand shocks, 
we can expect positive variations in both domestic currency credit and foreign currency credit in the 
domestic market. If there is a negative supply shock in the credit market, we can expect a negative 
reaction of domestic currency credit and a positive reaction of foreign currency credit considering the  
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substitution of flow-of-funds capacity of the banking system. With these identifying assumptions, we 
decompose the variance of the change in domestic currency and foreign currency credit. 
In this way, we can identify what percentage of variation in domestic credit is due to supply and 
demand shocks respectively. With monthly data from 1979-2000, the variance in domestic currency 
credit due to supply shocks is 20%, while the variance in foreign currency credit due to supply shocks 
is more than 90%. The variance in domestic credit explained by demand shocks represents around 
80%, while the variance in foreign currency credit explained by demand shocks is almost zero. It is 
clear that 80% of the variation in domestic currency credit resulted from monetary transmission 
through the money channel. 
In conclusion, it seems clear that the ability of the banking system to use substitute funding neutralises 
the credit channel of monetary transmission in Peru. 
4.1  Transmission mechanisms of monetary policy 
In attaining its main goal, the central bank announces the medium-term pattern of its inflation target 
and manages its policy instruments (open market operations, exchange market operations and 
discount window credits) in order to control the commercial bank current account balances maintained 
at the central bank (operational target). 
The daily control of the commercial banks￿ average balances at the central bank, through 
management of the policy instruments and interaction with the financial system, induces the desired 
pattern of base money growth (intermediate target). 
The strategy of the central bank rests on the close and stable relationship of base money growth with 
the inflation target. The evolution of base money growth gives an early warning about the stance of 
monetary policy and, through its impact on market interest rates, broad money aggregates, banking 
system credits to the private sector and expectations, influences aggregate demand and inflation. 
The time horizon of these monetary transmission mechanisms is between eight and 16 months. 
 
In the diagram it is clear that through the management of its policy instruments the central bank affects 
the liquidity position of banks and, subsequently, their current account balances maintained at the 
central bank. The change in the availability of funds in the money market causes changes in the 
overnight interest rate and the market exchange rate which, in turn, determine the banking system 
demand for reserves. 
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These central bank operating procedures lead to the desired target of base money growth. In turn, the 
base money, the overnight rate and the exchange rate affect longer-term lending interest rates and 
other variables such as inflation and depreciation expectations, the broad money aggregate in 
domestic currency, and private sector credit. This group of variables influences the spending decisions 
of the public, affecting aggregate demand. In particular, these variables influence the spending on 
consumer goods that comprise the CPI basket of goods and services. The variation of this index is the 
inflation definition used to specify the final targets. Finally, aggregate demand affects inflation. 
4.2  Modelling the operating procedures of the central bank 
As presented in Quispe (2000) and following Bernanke and Mihov (1998), the underlying structure of 































where vector P represents monetary policy variables. The vector Y  contains non-policy 
macroeconomic variables. Equation (1) shows the policymakers￿ reaction functions, whereas 
equation  (2) represents the structural relationships that describe the rest of the transmission 
mechanism. The variables 
P
t v  and 
Y
t v  can be naturally interpreted as unobservable structural shocks 
to the policy variables and the rest of the economic structure respectively. The system (1)-(2) needs 
identifying assumptions before the estimation of the parameters and structural shocks. 
1.  We can assume that 
P
t v  and 
Y
t v  are mutually uncorrelated structural error terms. This need 
only mean that 
P
t v  is defined as the vector of disturbances to the policy variables that are 
unrelated to the rest of the economic environment. We can go further and assume that all 
interaction between these errors occurs through the dynamics of the system: that 
Y A  and 
P A  are both identity matrices. In what follows, we make this assumption. 
However, additional, more controversial assumptions are necessary. 
2.  For example, equation (1) can be identified if we assume that there is only one policy 
variable and that the shocks to this variable do not affect the given macroeconomic variables 
within the current period (Christiano et al (1996)). 
The latter assumption  0 0  C is more plausible with high-frequency data. We use monthly data on 
macroeconomic and financial variables (including the Central Reserve Bank of Peru￿s GDP estimates) 
that have been reliably available since mid-1991. Despite that, with dollarisation some of the banking 
sector series that we could include in the VAR, such as domestic currency deposits foreign currency 
deposits, and residents￿ deposits abroad, can respond within a month to changes in policy. 
In the Peruvian case, we cannot make the alternative assumption that the policymaker does not 
respond to contemporaneous information: we cannot assume that  0 0  D . Information from 
macroeconomic variables can quickly lead to monetary policy changes. For example, foreign 
exchange market intervention is used to smooth out exchange rate shocks on a regular basis. 
Another problem with these assumptions is that interest rates, cash in circulation, foreign exchange 
intervention and total reserves can all be used as policy variables in Peru. If each of these variables 
affects the other macroeconomic variables through different channels, including only a single policy 
variable in the VAR may be difficult to justify. 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) propose that to identify the optimal monetary policy indicator it is 
worthwhile to study the operating procedure of the central bank. In Peru, with a banking system that 
intermediates dollar assets, the central bank uses foreign exchange market interventions as an 
important instrument to provide domestic currency liquidity and issues certificates of deposit, 
auctioned in open market operations, announcing the amount of the auction and letting the market 
determine the interest rate. These instruments regulate base money creation through control of the 
reserves market.  
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In terms of equations (1) and (2), the problem now becomes to identify the impulse responses and 
structural shocks when there are many policy variables in vector P and when the contemporaneous 
reaction matrices A0, B0,C0, and D0 cannot be restricted. 
The observable residuals in the VAR equation with policy variables, equation (1), include the 
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   . Bernanke and Mihov suggest that plausible restrictions can be 




  , which tells us about how the unobservable policy shocks 
P
t v  feed 
into the policy variables. 
In order to show how this can be implemented in Peru, an example can be provided with four policy 
variables: exchange rate interventions e, the money base M0 and its two components separately: total 
reserves  TR and cash holdings of households CASH. We can write down the plausible set of 
restrictions between the observable residuals to these variables￿ VAR equations (the ut) and the 
unobservable shocks (the 
P
t v ): 
D
e CDR TR v βu αu u       (1) 
B
e CDR CASH v δu γu u       (2) 
S e e B B D D
M v v v v u        0  (3) 
S S e B B D D
e v θ v v θ v θ u      (4) 
Equation (1), the banking system total reserves demand, depends negatively on its price and the 
interest rate of central bank CDs,
3 and positively on deviations of exchange rate devaluation. The 
positive relationship with the exchange rate comes from the interventions of the central bank in the 
foreign exchange market. 
Equation (2), household demand for cash holdings, is negatively related to the market interest rate 
(using as proxy the CD rate) and inversely related to the exchange rate. This relationship comes from 
the free holdings of currencies in the country. 
Equation (3), shows the reaction function of the central bank to shocks in total reserves demand, to 
shocks in household cash holdings demand, and to its own ￿monetary policy￿ shocks. 
Equation (4) relates to the exchange rate devaluations that are carried out or allowed by the central 
bank. As the exchange rate becomes a policy variable, the restrictions are analogous to equation (3). 
4.3  Further identification assumptions 
The system has 14 unknown parameters (including the four structural shocks) that have to be 
estimated from 10 variances and covariances. Just-identification of the system requires four more 
restrictions. First, we assume that  = , which means that the banking system interprets the 
difference between the nominal interest rate and the rate of devaluation as the cost of total reserves in 
domestic currency (this assumption is reliable for dollarised economies). The second assumption is 
that, for monetary policy to be effective in a dollarised economy, there is no currency substitution; a 
proxy to this assumption is to make  = 0. Consistent with this approach is to assume that the central 
bank does not react through exchange market interventions to shocks to household demand for cash 
holdings, that is 
B = 0. A fourth assumption comes from the separation of the reaction function of the 
central bank through exchange market interventions from the reaction function through base money 
creation, that is 
e = 0. This is a necessary assumption, since supply side base money creation should 
include (as a source) the exchange market interventions of the central bank. 
                                                       
3  The cost of total reserves for the banking system should be the federal funds rate. However, the Peruvian banking system 
has reported this rate to the central bank only since the last quarter of 1995. Instead, we use the interest rate of central bank 
CDs. The use of the CD rate is valid because it is a market rate: the central bank auctions announced amounts of CDs and 
the bidders set the price. We have carried out estimations for a small sample that uses the federal funds rate to test the 
adequacy of this assumption.  
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With these four assumptions, we can obtain a just-identified system the estimation of which provides 
us with an indicator of monetary policy that is the weighted average of traditional indicators such as 
the CD interest rate. 

































































































































4.4  Empirical results on operating procedures of the central bank 
In order to evaluate the model, we need to write the equations in the form of variations and separate 
the total reserves demand of the banking system into its components. 
One of the characteristics of monetary policy with the use of monetary aggregates as operative or 
intermediate targets is the close relationship between the operative procedures of the central bank 
and the money market of the banking system. The following is an extension of the model presented by 
Quispe (2000) regarding the operating procedure of the central bank. 
The demand for base money includes the household demand for cash holdings and the banking 
system demand for reserves, which in turn includes the demand for vault cash holdings of the banking 
system and the demand for commercial bank current account balances at the central bank. The 
central bank uses this commercial bank current account balance as its operational target. Writing in 
differences we have: 
c
t t t t
D
























t v v v v bcr cabs         _  (9) 
Equation (5) is the change in demand for base money, which depends negatively on changes in the 
interest rate, negatively on changes in the depreciation rate and positively on changes in real GDP. 
Equation (6) describes the change in the household demand for cash holdings, which is negatively 
related to changes in interest rates and positively related to changes in real GDP (indicator of current 
transactions). We skip the relationship with changes in the depreciation rate because, as stated in 
earlier sections of the paper, there is asset substitution rather than money substitution in the economy, 
and because of the current transactional role of the cash holdings. 
Equation (7) represents the variation of demand for vault cash holdings of the banking system, which 
is related to changes in base money demand. Commercial banks hold operative cash to meet public 
cash requirements. These domestic currency operative cash holdings are proportional to the deposits 
of the private sector (5% on average during the last three years). It is known that this money 
aggregate results from the product of base money and the money multiplier, 1 = 0.05 times the 
money multiplier. This characteristic enters the model as a condition: 
mult 05 . 0 δ1    (10) 
Equation (8) is an identity referring to the demand side components of the variation in base money, 
which is the sum of: variation in household cash holdings, variation in vault cash holdings of the banks, 
and the current account balances held by commercial banks at the central bank.  
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Equation (9) reflects the reaction function of the central bank through changes on the current account 
balances of the banking system in response to base money shocks, shocks to household cash 
holdings demand, shocks to the vault cash holdings of banks and to its own ￿monetary policy￿ shocks. 
Other conditions are related to the reserve requirement policy of the central bank (6% of the domestic 
currency liabilities of banks) and the requirement to maintain one percentage point of the reserve 
requirement as current account balances of commercial banks held at the central bank: 
   t t t bcr cabs bs vch m mult _ _ 06 . 0       (11) 
  t t bcr cabs m mult _ 01 . 0     (12) 
Solving this system allows us to determine the reaction function of the central bank through its 
operational target, which, in turn, is translated into the intermediate target reflected in the changes in 
base money. 
The preliminary results with a semi-structural VAR show that positive shocks to current account 
balances of the banking system cause an immediate negative reaction in the short-term banking rate 
(Graph 7). It returns to its former level after five months. Similarly, the domestic currency depreciates, 
reaching its highest reaction after six months and returning to its former pattern after 15 months. 
Finally, base money growth increases, reaching its highest reaction after three to four months, with 
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4.4.1  A non-recursive approach to identifying policy 
To estimate the final effects on inflation we need to specify the whole system identification procedure. 
We use the approach presented by Leeper et al (1996), trying to find enough restrictions on the 
contemporaneous reactions of variables to each other in Peru without necessarily invoking a recursive 
ordering. 
Commercial banks￿ current account as operational target for monetary policy 
The following table is the adaptation for Peru of this non-recursive VAR identification merging the 
macroeconomic variables together with the operating procedures of the central bank, considering the 
case of using the commercial banks￿ current account at the central bank as operational target for 
monetary policy.  
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Non-recursive identification assumptions: 
commercial banks current account at the central bank 
as operational target for monetary policy 
  CPI  GDP BM0 CHH VHB VBN NER RBN CAC 
CPI C11          
GDP C21 C 22         
BM0 C31 C 32 C 33      C 37 C 38  
CHH   C42 C 43 C 44     ?  C48  
VHB    C53 C 54 C 55      
VBN   C62  C 64 C 65 C 66  C 68 C 69 
NER   C72 C 73 C 74  C 76 C 77  C 79 
RBN   C82    C 85 C 86 C 87 C 88 C 89 
CAC C91 C 92 C 93 C 94 C 95 C 96 C 97 C 98 C 99 
We classify the variables in the non-recursive VAR in the following categories: 
Information variables are used as indicators by monetary policy; therefore current shocks to these 
variables feed through immediately to the policy variable, but because these indicators are assumed to 
be more costly to adjust than policy variables, they react to policy shocks only after a lag of at least 
one month. In Peru we can assume that output (GDP), consumer prices (CPI) and, very contentiously, 
the exchange rate (NER) are examples of information variables. 
Policy variables immediately reflect the monetary policy stance but only respond to current shocks in 
information variables. Short-term money market interest rates (RBN), cash (CHH), base money (BM0) 
and commercial banks￿ current account at the central bank (CAC) are all likely contenders for this 
designation in Peru. 
1.  Output (GDP) and prices (CPI) adjust slowly to the other variables, with output unresponsive 
to current price movements (Graph 8). However, the exchange rate (NER) is now allowed to 
react within a quarter to shocks to any of the other variables in the system, with the 
exception of CPI, vault cash holdings of the banking system (VHB) and the overnight interest 
rate (RBN). One reason why this happens is that the Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
intervenes to reduce ￿abrupt and transitory changes in the exchange rate￿ (De la Rocha 
1998, p 186). 
2.  The assumptions about the response of base money (BM0) reflect the fact that it is targeted 
by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. The quarter-on-quarter changes to base money will 
therefore depend on either temporary deviations from the target or revision of the target 
itself. Money targets can be set and revised during the year to incorporate information about 
future inflationary pressure taken from GDP, prices and the exchange rate
4 (De la Rocha, 
(1998, p 186), Choy Chong (1999, p 196), and so these variables affect base money in the 
same period. Interest rate changes (RBN), understood to represent permanent changes in 
velocity, and exchange rates (NER) are incorporated in the base money target. 
3.  Short-term interest rates (represented by the overnight banking system rate, RBN) react 
within a quarter to CPI, GDP, vault cash holdings of the commercial banks (VHB), and vault 
cash holdings of Banco de la Naci￿n (state-owned bank in charge of the management of 
treasury funds). Additionally, they react contemporaneously to nominal devaluations, their 
own shocks, and shocks to the current account of the commercial banks. 
4.  Money components used for transaction purposes (cash holdings of households, CHH) may 
react immediately to current shocks to GDP. However, whether cash holdings will be 
affected by contemporaneous exchange rate disturbances could depend on how important 
                                                       
4  Net purchases of dollars by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru in foreign exchange intervention are sterilised so as not to 
affect base money.  
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currency substitution is. A question mark in the table indicates the coefficient over which this 
decision has to be made. (We assume that in Peru there is no currency substitution given 
the empirical evidence previously stated by Quispe (2000). Of course, it depends on its own 
shocks and on interest rate shocks. 
5.  Some banking sector variables, specifically domestic currency vault cash holdings of 
commercial banks (VHB) and of Banco de la Naci￿n (VBN), are held primarily for current 
financial transactions of the financial system. VHB is therefore assumed to be unaffected by 
current shocks to GDP. However, shocks to GDP have a contemporaneous impact on VBN 
considering that public sector current revenues are contemporaneous with GDP. 
6.  The operational target (CAC) reacts to all the variables. This corresponds to the approach 
that considers the contemporaneous relationship between the operational policy instrument 
and the other policy instruments, macroeconomic variables and the main target of monetary 
policy. 
With this identification procedure, the non-recursive VAR estimates of impulse response functions for 
Peru (see the following graph) reflect clearly the fact that the current account performs adequately as 
a predictor of the inflation rate. A positive shock to the commercial banks￿ current account at the 
central bank leads to an increase in base money and in the inflation rate within a time horizon of eight 
to 16 months. 
Graph 8 
 
Testing the overnight interest rate as operational target for monetary policy in Peru 
There is an important issue related to the relevance of monetary base targeting in a low-inflation 
environment. The lack of relationship between base money growth and the inflation rate, the instability 
of money demand, the increasing relevance of transparent monetary policy, and the increasing 
necessity of simple and clear communication with the population raise the importance of the interest 
rate as the operational target of monetary policy. Moreover, those facts are closely connected with the 
relevance of the interest rate as a clear signal of the stance of monetary policy related to its main 
objective of price stability with a stable long-run growth of output. 
In that sense, we test through the non-recursive VAR estimation the performance of the overnight 
interest rate as if it were the operational target during the sample period. To do that we need to 
change some identification assumptions.  
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The overnight interest rate, acting in this case as the operational target for monetary policy, now reacts 
to all the variables, as can be seen in the following table. 
In contrast, the commercial banks￿ current account at the central bank, now acts mostly as an 
informative variable. It does not react to contemporaneous shocks on inflation, base money and cash 
holdings of households, maintaining its contemporaneous relationship with the other variables of the 
operative procedures of the central bank. 
Non-recursive identification assumptions: 
overnight interest rates as operational target 
  CPI  GDP BM0 CHH VHB VBN NER RBN CAC 
CPI C11          
GDP C21 C 22         
BM0 C31 C 32 C 33      C 37 C 38  
CHH   C42 C 43 C 44     ?  C48  
VHB    C53 C 54 C 55      
VBN   C62  C 64 C 65 C 66  C 68 C 69 
NER   C72 C 73 C 74  C 76 C 77  C 79 
RBN C81 C 82 C 83 C 84 C 85 C 86 C 87 C 88 C 89 
CAC   C92    C 95 C 96 C 97 C 98 C 99 
We can see the estimation result of this new identification procedure in Graph 9. Here, a positive 
shock to the overnight interest rate of the banking system clearly generates a reduction in the inflation 
rate. There are theoretical arguments supporting these results: in the interbank money market the 
overnight interest rate is the price whose quantitative counterpart is the commercial banks￿ current 
account held at the central bank. Thus, in terms of monetary policy in Peru these findings give some 
support to the feasibility of using the overnight interest rate as operational target. 
Graph 9 
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In summary, these identification procedures give a clear role to the monetary base as an instrument 
for reducing inflation in Peru. However, there is an important issue related to its relevance as an 
instrument for preserving long-run price stability in a context of low inflation. 
As shown in Graph 10, using alternatively the recursive approach of Christiano, Eichenbaun and 
Evans (1996) - CEE, and the non-recursive approach of Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) - LSZ; and 
considering the Central Bank Certificate of Deposits rate - CDR as the relevant interest rate for the 
operating procedures of the Central Bank, the finding that a positive shock to base money significantly 
affects inflation after eight months, a year or a year and a half is shown to be robust. Many of the other 
impulse responses are similar. Also, to confront the criticism that can be levelled at this VAR in terms 
of the correct identification of the role of policy, we have disaggregated M0 into its components - cash 
holdings of households, and total reserves (which in turn is composed of vault cash holdings of the 
commercial banks and the public sector bank, the current account maintained at the central bank) - 
and also allow for a separate role for the overnight interest rate. 
Graph 10 
  PERU: Shocks to base money 
CEE  : CPI  CEE: CDR CEE: NER
LSZ  : CPI  LSZ: CDR LSZ: NER





























































Our results have at least established the robust result that M0 shocks (or possibly just shocks to its 
cash holdings component) are responsible for about 30% of long-run inflationary movements. 
The empirical results of these structural VAR procedures gave us some indication of the time horizon 
and magnitude of the impact of monetary policy on its final target: the inflation rate. In this case, the 
estimations conclude that the time horizon of monetary policy transmission is between eight and 16 
months. This result is consistent with a small open economy with partial dollarisation such as Peru. 
Another finding is that every 10 additional percentage points of variation in base money generate an 
additional 3.8% of inflation. A 10% depreciation of the exchange rate generates 1.2% of additional 
inflation. 
It is important to recall that, to avoid misunderstandings about the variation of base money, the central 
bank (in coordination with the central government) has been announcing a target range for the 
inflation rate since 1994. Graph 11 shows low levels of inflation, with only some small deviations from 
target. Underlying inflation exhibits better performance, although it is used only as an indicator.  




















In the light of this, a possible interpretation of the VAR results is that money base control has been 
successful in keeping the evolution of the inflation rate around its target range since 1994. 
5.  Identifying the money and credit channels of transmission 
In the Peruvian case there is a banking credit dependence of the small and medium-sized firms, and 
even some of the big corporations still have only limited participation in the capital markets. This 
characteristic invites the conclusion that the credit (lending) channel of monetary policy is fully active. 
However, the central bank would have had only limited power to reduce the credit supply of the 
commercial banks, at least until 1996-97, through the reduction of the financial funds due to the 
existence of alternative external sources of funding for the banking system, neutralising the possible 
impacts of monetary policy on domestic credit to the private sector. 
Just by looking at the credit series we cannot identify which part of the credit variations represents 
changes in the supply of funds (associated with the credit or lending channel) and which part is 
accounted for by changes in the demand for credit (mainly associated with the money channel). 
We can indirectly identify these monetary policy channels using the supply and demand shocks 
structural VAR procedure. Thus if there are demand shocks, we can expect positive variations in both 
domestic currency credit and foreign currency credit in the domestic market. If there is a negative 
supply shock in the credit market, we can expect a negative reaction of domestic currency credit and a 
positive reaction of foreign currency credit considering the substitution of flow-of-funds capacity of the 
banking system. With these basic assumptions we decompose the variance of the change in domestic 
currency and foreign currency credit. 
In this way, we can identify what percentage of variation in domestic credit is due to supply and 
demand shocks respectively. Graphs 12 and 13 show that during 1979-2000, the variance in domestic 
currency credit due to supply shocks is 20%, while the variance in foreign currency credit due to 
supply shocks is more than 90%.  





Furthermore, we can identify that the variance in domestic credit explained by demand shocks 
represents around 80%, while the variance in foreign currency credit explained by demand shocks is 
almost zero. It is clear that 80% of the variation in domestic currency credit resulted from monetary 
transmission through the money channel. 





The inflation process in Peru is driven by demand shocks, with monetary shocks accounting for a 
range of 30-40% of the variance in the inflation rate. 
In identifying the best indicator of the monetary policy stance, we found that different studies for Peru 
on this topic have shown that money aggregates are the best indicators of the monetary policy stance.  
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The time horizon of monetary policy transmission is between eight and 16 months. This result is 
consistent with a small open economy with partial dollarisation such as Peru. Another finding is that 
every 10 additional percentage points of variation in base money generate an additional 3.8% of 
inflation. A 10% depreciation of the exchange rate generates 1.2% of additional inflation. 
The empirical results show that the money channel seems to be effective in Peru. There is no clear 
evidence of the effectiveness of the credit channel. 
The dollarisation process in Peru is mainly of the asset substitution type. Domestic currency is used 
for current transactions and is closely related to the inflation rate. Since cash holdings represent 
75-80% of base money, there should not be any problem in considering base money creation an 
intermediate target. 
The non-recursive identified model estimations reflect clearly the fact that the current account 
performs adequately as a predictor of the inflation rate, a sign of a good operational instrument of 
monetary policy. A positive shock to the commercial banks￿ current account at the central bank leads 
to an increase in base money and in the inflation rate within a time horizon of eight to 16 months. 
The change in the identification procedure, preceding as if the overnight interest rate played the role of 
operational target for monetary policy, shows that this variable can be used as the indicator of the 
monetary policy stance in Peru. There is a clear negative reaction of the inflation rate against positive 
shocks to the commercial banks￿ overnight interest rate.  
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Appendix: 
 Model of supply, demand and money shocks 
used by Machado et al (1994) 
This is a VAR model with inflation, GDP growth and money as dependent variables. In this model the 
innovations to the economy belong to two possible types, ￿supply￿ or ￿demand￿ shocks, and money 
shocks are accounted as monetary policy shocks. As in Blanchard and Quah (1989), names are given 
to the innovations according to the particular means of identification, since these shocks are 
unobserved - that is, not directly related to the left-hand side variables. These shocks completely 
describe the set of structural disturbances in the economy. 
The model is described as follows: 
t
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The Wold representation is  t t L D Y  ) ( ￿  , where   ’ m y p t      . 
The MA representation is  t t L A Y  ) (   where   ’ , , , t ms t d t s t       is the vector of structural shocks in 












































The matrix  0 B  needs to be fully identified. It is important to define a set of minimal assumptions and a 
long-run restriction to fully identify  0 B . 
Minimal assumptions 
The minimal assumptions now specify the direction of the effect of an innovation in money growth on 
inflation and output growth. According to the standard IS-LM model, an innovation in money will 
increase both prices and output
5 (ie  0  im b  and  0  ym b ). On the other hand, it is assumed that 
money growth is not affected contemporaneously (ie within a quarter) by either supply or demand 
shocks. 
This set of assumptions, together with the relation 
T B B 0 0 ￿
      specifies a system of six equations 
and seven unknowns (four parameters in B0 and three variances in    ). Thus, there is one degree of 
freedom to choose between  id b  and  ys b  while satisfying the relation 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ (
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ( ￿ ￿
m i m iy id ym im id im




      
      
  
   
  (2) 
Notice that in this relation all variables but  id b  and  ys b  can be estimated from the VAR. Moreover,  im b  

















    (3) 
                                                       
5  See Sargent, T (1987), Chapter 2.  
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The minimal assumptions imply a positive relation between  id b  and  ys b  and therefore do not set an 
upper bound for these parameters. This does not pose a major problem for the results of the variance 
decomposition under specification uncertainty. 
In this model there is a range of feasible values for  id b . However, this kind of uncertainty does not 
affect the fraction of the variance of inflation or GDP accounted for by monetary shocks, which is the 
same for any value of  id b . Again, values bigger than three do not lead to different behaviour in the 
decomposition of variances, so they are taken out of consideration.  
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